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THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS  
AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION 
 
James A. Roumasset* 
 
The institutional economics if John Commons (1934) contained 
two related objectives.  The first was to explain the evolution of 
economics.  The second was to analyze the effects of institutions on 
resource allocation and the distribution of income.  The method of 
explaining the evolution of institutions was historical.  In explaining 
resource allocation, Commons used institutional considerations such 
as interest groups and bargaining power largely as an alternative to 
neoclassical economics. 
 
Common’s brand of institutional economics has been practically 
extinct in the evolution of economic methodology.  The reason for 
this is that historical explanations tend to be arbitrary and fail to 
identify alternative causes of change.  At the time, “institutional” 
explanations of economic events and patterns tend to be ad hoc and 
irrefutable 
 
A body of literature has now been developed from somewhat 
diverse sources, however, which may provide a new paradigm for 
achieving Common’s objectives.  Without claim to originality, we 
call this paradigm the new institutional economics.1 In explaining the 
existence and evolution of institutions, the new institutional 
economics uses conventional economic tools such as benefits, costs, 
and equilibrium.  In explaining resource allocation and income 
distribution, the new approach uses institutions in conjunction with 
rather than as an alternative to neoclassical theory. 
 
 
 
 
      
*Associate Professor of Economics, University of Hawai`i, Manoa and Philippine 
Representative, Agricultural Development Council, Inc.  This paper was prepared for 
presentation at the Western Economics Association meetings, June 22, 1978, Honolulu under 
the sponsorship of the National Science Foundation, SOC 76-83845. 
 
     1.  See e.g. Dolan (1977) for a previous use and description of the “new institutional 
economics.”  The term has also been attributed to some of the work of Armen Alchain and 
Harold Demsetz (see, e.g., Alchain and Demsetz 1972) 
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One of the primary concerns of the new institutional economics is 
explaining nonmarket resource allocation.  This is an especially 
important area of research for helping to describe the organization of 
agriculture in developing countries.  Since the cost of market 
operation is characterized by economies of scale, markets for 
agricultural products in isolated regions of developing countries are 
often poorly developed or nonexistent.  Factors of production are 
often contracted for by nonmarket devices.  Similarly, agricultural 
products are typically disposed of (e.g., for and by an individual 
household).  It is therefore important for understanding the prospects 
and potential for agricultural development to improve both our 
empirical and theoretical knowledge of these institutional 
arrangements. 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to provide a methodology for 
investigating institutional arrangements in agriculture and to illustrate 
the methodology by explaining selected patterns in agricultural 
contracts.  The paper is organized as follows.  In section I, we review 
the literature which makes up the new institutional economics.  By 
integrating and extending the literature, a new method for explaining 
the organization of production emerges.    This methodology is 
developed and described in section II.  In section III, certain stylized 
facts about agricultural organization are presented, developed and 
explained using the principles discussed in section II. 
 
I.  Development of the Efficiency Principles 
 
In one of the most celebrated and controversial articles in the recent 
history of economic thought, Coase (1960) introduced the idea that, 
even when spillover effects which are external to strictly market 
exchange are present, the invisible hand does not necessarily fail.  
Specifically, private contracting may act as a substitute for the 
nonexistent market in the spillover activity.  Cheung (1969) applied 
an equivalent proposition to sharecropping and argued persuasively 
that under competitive conditions private contracting between 
landowner and tenant would lead to the same resource allocation as if 
there had been competitive factor markets for labor and/or land.  
Roumasset (1978) has shown that the Coase-Cheung proposition that 
contracts can act as perfect substitutes for markets can be proved 
using the concept of core.  This gives rise to what we shall call the 
principle of first best efficiency, to wit: 
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If property rights are well established, contracts are easily enforced, information 
costs are negligible, and numbers are sufficient to make attempts to monopolize 
unstable, then factors of production will be allocated efficiently and receive their 
competitive factor payments, whether market conditions exist or not.2 
 
While the first-best efficiency principle helps to explain a variety 
of patterns in agricultural contracts, it tends to be a deficient in 
situations where enforcement and information costs are important.  
Several authors have written about the evolution of property rights, 
contracts, and institutions in a world with imperfect information and 
enforcement.  Hayami and Ruttan (1971) following a paradigm 
developed by Davis and North (1971) for explaining economic 
history, have proposed the induced innovation hypothesis which 
states: 
 
…institutional innovations occur because it appears profitable for individuals or 
groups in society to undertake the costs.  It is unlikely that institutional change will 
prove viable unless the benefits to society exceed the cost.  Changes in market 
prices and technological opportunities introduce disequilibrium in existing 
institutional arrangements by creating profitable new opportunities for the 
institutional innovations. 
 
Demsetz (1967, 1969, 1972) develops a similar principle which can 
be paraphrased as follows: 
 
Property rights and institutions in general will evolve so as to minimize excess 
burden.  This is equivalent to saying that the set of institutions which maximizes the 
differences between benefits and costs will evolve.3 
 
In what follows, we refer to this proposition as the principle of 
second-best efficiency.  The distinction drawn here between second-
best and first-best models is the traditional one found, for example, in 
the optimal taxation literature (Baumol and Bradford 1970, Mirrlees 
1971).  In the first-best world, efficiency implies no excess burden to 
be costless.  In the second-best world where these same things are 
costly, efficiency or “constrained Pareto optimality” implies that 
excess burden exists but it is at a minimum.4 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  “Market” is used in its conventional neoclassical sense, i.e. buyers and sellers 
only interact via prices that are exogenous to the agents.  
3.  For a more detailed exposition of this literature, see Roumasset (1974). 
4.  The locus of constrained Pareto optimal points is Samuelson’s (1950) feasibility 
frontier. 
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A related literature is called the economics of internal organization.  
In this literature, internal modes of organization including hierarchies 
of various kinds and team organization are examined.  Second-best or 
“comparative institutions” (Demsetz 1972; Arrow 1969, 1974; Spence 
1975; and Williamson 1977).  This literature is also concerned with 
transactions which are handled by organizational structures within the 
firm and which are external to the firm.  In this way, for example, the 
degree of vertical integration becomes an endogenous variable.5 
 
II.  A Methodology for the New Institutional Economics 
 
The conventional format for empirical analysis begins with deriving 
hypotheses from theoretical considerations, in particular as 
implications of particular models.  Information is then collected using 
an appropriate sampling procedure and the hypotheses are subjected 
to statistical tests.  Given the difficulty of including the relevant 
institutional content in abstract models and our limited knowledge of 
institutional arrangements, this approach may not be particularly 
fruitful in the context of agricultural development.  Furthermore, in 
order to understand the role of institutions in agricultural 
development, it is important not only to test hypotheses, but also to 
learn the details of the institutional arrangements in place and how 
these arrangements change over time.  A more fruitful approach 
therefore may be to reverse the order of conventional analysis and to 
do the empirical work first.  The approach then is to first document 
institutional arrangements of agricultural contracts, then to inductively 
identify patterns in those arrangements, and finally to explain the 
patterns observed, using the efficiency principles or other 
propositions. 
 
A question remains of how to combine the various explanatory 
principles.  It is natural in this regard to apply the best-developed 
principle first.  Since the first-best principle is based in a well-defined 
theorem, it should be applied first to see what patterns it can explain.  
The second-best principle is very close to being well-defined but 
contains  a minor  point of ambiguity related to the  index 
 
 
 
5.  See Williamson (1977) and the references cited therein. 
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number problem.6  More importantly, it is  difficult to quantify excess 
burden in order to compare the efficiency of alternate institutions.  In 
lieu of that, we can discuss the determinants of excess burden and see 
under what conditions these factors will lead to a large or small 
amount of economic waste.  Despite these difficulties, the second-
best principle is probably also the second most powerful concept for 
explaining patterns in agricultural contracts. 
 
A set of less developed, but doubtless important, propositions can 
be found in the political economy area.  These principles can be 
called third-best in the sense that additional constraints are added to 
the second-best problem.  In the third-best world, not only do 
enforcement and information costs act as constraints, but so do 
political considerations.  In other words, the feasibility frontier is 
pushed further toward the origin because of the constraint that a 
viable economic system must be consistent with the given structure 
of interest groups and the distribution of political power.  Since 
models describing the effects of political constraints on resource 
allocation are even less developed than the transactions cost 
considerations of the second-best, political economy considerations 
should only be applied to patterns which cannot be explained by the 
efficiency principles. 
 
The methodology of successive application of various explanatory 
principles may be faulted on the grounds that the theory cannot be 
refuted.  We must bear in mind, however, that this analysis is not to 
verify a particular theory, but to explain nonmarket resource 
allocation.  The methodology outlined above is not a theory in the 
usual sense.  It is a taxonomy and a method of explanation. 
 
On the other hand, theory may be inductively generated by the new 
institutional economics.  The empirical work generates certain 
patterns that are subsequently explained by the appropriate model.  
The theory in this paradigm is the explanatory model itself.  While 
the theory formally must stand or fall on the model’s internal 
consistency, the usefulness of the behavioral postulates and 
consistency with additional information, it has the great advantage of 
having   evolved   out  of   actual   experience   instead   of   armchair 
 
 
6.  Measuring excess burden runs afoul of the question “Which set of prices should be used to 
measure national income?” or  “Which of the many measures of consumer surplus should be 
employed. 
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empiricism.  At the same time, this approach makes maximal use of 
limited evidence.  That is, inference is theoretical, not statistical. 
 
An example of this approach is the “Alchain-Allen theorem” that 
the average quality of apples and oranges sold in a market is directly 
related to the distance of that market from the point of production.  
This  pattern was derived from casual empiricism, but real empiricism 
nonetheless.  Subsequently, Borcherding and Silberberg (1978) 
showed that the postulate of utility maximization and reasonable 
restrictions on the cross elasticities leads to the Alchain-Allen result.7 
That is, by building reasonable restrictions into conventional 
economic models, one is able to construct explanatory models of 
particular patterns observed. 
 
III.  Some Illustrations 
 
In this section, we describe various patterns that have been observed 
n agricultural contracts in Southeast Asia and use the methodology 
developed above to explain why these patterns exist. 
 
First-Best Patterns and Explanation 
 
We begin with relationships between characteristics of share 
tenancy contracts and land quality.  In rice production in the 
Philippines for example, it has been observed that higher quality land 
is inversely related to the size of the farms under share tenancy 
contracts and directly related to the landowner’s percentage share.8 
 
The explanation of these patterns requiring the first-best efficiency 
principle with a reasonable, but restrictive,9 definition of land quality.  
Specifically, land type I is said to be better quality than land type j if: 
 
 
7.  The restrictive assumptions should be “…in principle at least, capable of 
independent confirmation…” (Borcherding and Silberberg 1978, p. 137). 
8.  Land quality here refers to a composite measure of all location-specific factors 
that influence expected profits.  Thus, land quality includes not only soil fertility and 
topography, but also adequacy of irrigation and predisposition to damage from pests 
and weather.  The patterns noted refer mainly to share tenancy before the most recent 
round of land reform initiated by Presidential Decree No. 27 of November 1972 was 
widely implemented.  For details of this pattern, see Roumasset (1976) and Roumasset 
and James (1978).  This quality-share relationship has also been documented for rice 
farms in India (Rudra 1975) and Indonesia (Geertz 1965) and for coconuts in the 
Philippines (Bernal-Torres and Sandoval 1967). 
9.  Economists often have an aversion to making models less general by 
incorporating restrictive conditions.  This  is  peculiar  since  it  is  essential  that  good 
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1. f ’i (l) > f ’j (l) where f ’i (l) is output per hectare, q, as a 
function of labor per hectare, l, in land type i. 
2. l  i  <  l  j  where l  i   is defined as the greatest l  i  such that  
           f ’i (l) = 0. 
 
In other words, land type I is said to be better quality if its marginal 
product of labor is higher, for the same labor intensity, and does not 
become zero at a higher labor intensity than the corresponding 
marginal product for land type i. 
 
From these assumptions, it follows that equilibrium labor intensity 
on better quality land, l *i , will be greater than  l *j.  Furthermore, 
rent per worker R/L  = r/l, is higher for better quality land.10 
 
Now if a family farm is the amount of land farmed by one family 
and family size is independent of land quality, then a higher labor 
intensity on better quality farms implies that better quality land will 
be divided into smaller farm units.  Furthermore, the higher rent per 
worker condition implies that the tenant’s percentage share must be 
lower (and the landowner share higher) on better quality land. 
 
Another pattern in share contracts that has been documented is that 
the landowner’s share varies directly with his contribution of 
percentage of fixed and variable capital inputs (e.g., equipment for 
land preparation and harvesting, chemicals, and seeds), the higher 
will be his share.  This is a direct implication of the first-best 
principle.  That principle requires that all factors be paid their 
marginal products.  The payment to the landowner must therefore be 
the sum of the marginal product of the capital times the amount of 
capital contributed by the landowner.  All other things equal, the 
greater amount of capital contributed by the landowner, the greater 
will be his share. 
 
A related observation is that landowner shares for coconut 
production are higher than landowner shares for abaca production.  
The most common coconut share is two-thirds and the most common 
share for abaca farms is one-third.  (The most common share for rice 
farms before 1973 was one-half.) 
 
theory abstract from reality in a useful way (Friedman 1935).  It is more surprising 
since almost no useful predictions (including downward sloping demand curves) can 
be made without restrictive assumptions. 
10.  See Roumasset (1976) and James (1978).  The following notation is used.  R is 
rent that is equal to rent per hectare, r, times the number of hectares, H.  Total labor, L, 
is l H.  Therefore, rent per worker R/L can be written as r/l. 
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This phenomenon is explained by two factors.  First, the 
landowner’s percentage contribution to capital is higher on coconut 
farms because the coconut trees themselves, which are owned by the 
landowner, constitute almost the entire capital stock and variable 
capital inputs such as fertilizer are almost never used.  In abaca 
production, however, the tenant usually owns implements for 
planting, cutting, and processing the abaca and the abaca plants 
themselves represent the tenant’s embodied labor, since the tenant 
does the planting and provides the planting material (which are cheap 
in comparison to coconuts).  Furthermore, the output elasticity of 
capital is small and the output elasticity of labor is large for abaca 
relative to coconut.  That is, the coconut production the most 
important input is the trees.  The tenant simply has to gather the nuts 
(and, in some cases, prepare copra).  Abaca, in contrast, is relatively 
labor intensive.  In harvesting a load, the tenant must cut, haul, strip, 
and dry the abaca and sometimes make it into rope as well. 
 
Output shares also vary according to physiological density.  In 
Bangladesh11 and the heavily populated parts of Indonesia (Geertz 
1965) landowner shares in rice production range from 50 to 67 
percent.  In the Philippines, however, which has a lower ratio of 
population to arable land, landowner shares greater than 50 percent 
have been almost unheard of even before land reform. 
 
To explain the relationship between high physiological density and 
high landowner’s share, we postulate that production of rice can be 
represented by the CES production function: 
 
[ ] rrr dd 1)1( --- -+Õ= LAQ  
 
Following available empirical evidence, we further postulate that  
ñ > 0 even in the long run, i.e.,, the elasticity of substitution, ó, is less 
than one.12 
 
Since, according to our hypothesis, factors are paid their marginal 
products, landowner share can be written as  
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11.  Bangladesh Rice Research Institute Sharecropping Survey, 1977. 
12.  For example, Yotopoulos et al. (1970) using the Indian farm management data 
for 1957-62 estimated ñ to be equal to .349, i.e. ó =.74.  Yotopoulos and Nugent (1976) 
 ROUMASSET: INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
 
Now a higher physiological density will be reflected (via factor 
prices) in a higher labor per hectare in rice production.  This implies 
in turn a higher output per hectare,13 (Q/H), and therefore a higher 
landowner share.  This exp lains the cross-sectional relationship 
between physiological density and landowner’s share. 
 
The same model explains the observation that landowner shares 
have gradually increased as real wages have fallen.  In the decade 
following the release of high-yielding rice varieties in Bangladesh, 
there has been a substantial increase in the proportion of share 
tenants who only receive only one-third of the output and a 
corresponding decrease in those receiving one-half.14  Ruttan (1978), 
citing evidence from White (1974), noted a similar trend in Java, 
Indonesia, another area with a high and rising physiological density: 
 
A sequence to induced institutional change in response to changes in land-
labor price ratios similar to that observed by North and Thomas in Europe has 
also reported in contemporary developing countries.  In Indonesia between 
1868 and 1928, a period of generally rapid growth, changes in patron-client 
obligations were modified in favor of tenants and landless laborers.  Since the 
late 1920’s as land prices have again risen against wage rates, the balance has 
again shifted in favor of landowners relative to tenants and laborers. 
 
In the Philippines, however, landowner shares have fallen since the 
introduction of HYVs, despite increasing population pressure on the 
land.  There are two major factors that help account for this apparent 
paradox.  First, the new rice technology developed at the 
International Rice Research Institute near Manila has been more 
suitable to Philippine conditions than to conditions in Indonesia or 
Bangladesh (Herdt and Barker 1977).  Second, the land reform 
program in the Philippines has been successful in forcing landowners 
to pay higher tenant shares.  Until very recently, landowners have 
been successful in avoiding a substantial loss of income by reducing 
farm size and curtailing capital contributions.15 Returning to the first 
point,  technological  change  has  been   more   appropriate   for   the  
 
cite evidence that, with the advent of the high-yielding varieties, the elast icity of 
substitution in agriculture is presently lower than during the 1957 to 1962 period.  See 
also Rande (1977) for supporting evidence of rice production in the Philippines 
13.  Since we are actually using “land” here as a synonym for “nonlabor inputs”, the 
prediction of a higher output per hectare should be interpreted as a higher output per 
unit of nonlabor input or as a lower output per worker. 
14.  Preliminary results of a survey conducted in cooperation with the Bangladesh 
Rice Research Institute. 
15.  See, for example, Roumasset and James (1978). 
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Philippines partly because, until recently, the HYVs have been 
developed and tested in Philippine soils and environmental conditions.   
The HYVs are also more appropriate for Philippine factor prices, 
given that the HYVs are not only land saving but chemical using.  
With the high cost of fertilizer and insecticide relative to the cost of 
labor in Indonesia and Bangladesh, the potential gains from adopting 
the new technology are much lower for these countries (Hayami and 
Ruttan 1971). 
 
The fact that the new rice technology has been a major 
technological change for the Philippines but only a minor one for 
Indonesia and Bangladesh helps explain the different trend of 
landowner shares in the Philippines.  For one thing, the substantial, 
land-saving technology change in the Philippines has ameliorated the 
rice of land prices against wages.  Even more importantly, because of 
the substantial technological change, the Philippines has  been moving 
along a metaproduction function, whose elasticity of substitution is 
one or more (Hayami and Ruttan 1971).16  Returning to the expression 
above, we see that since ó > 1 corresponds to ñ < 0, landowner’s share 
will remain constant or fall slightly with increases in  Q/H induced by 
the rising rent-wage ratio. 
 
Even if the elasticity of substitution is only one, land-saving 
technological change will result in a decrease in landowner’s share.  
To see this, consider the Cobb-Douglas function: 
 
)1( baba --= FLHQ  
 
where F stands for fertilizer and other chemicals.  Now land-saving, 
fertilizer-using technological change implies that á falls and (1-á-â) 
rises.  Therefore the landowner’s share falls and the share of fertilizer 
and other chemicals rises.  Indeed, this effect of land-saving 
technological change on the respective shares of landowners and 
chemicals occurred even before land reform legislation was 
aggressively implemented (Herdt and Ranade 1975, Ranade 1977). 
 
 
16.  A meta production function is one that is for the very long run, i.e., given sufficient 
time to develop new technology in response to new factor prices.  Such technological 
change is not automatic, however, since it must be funded from the public sector.  Due 
to the substantial technological change in the Philippine case, we can regard the 
Philippines as moving along the meta production function and using the elasticity of 
substitution estimated from a cross section of countries. 
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Second Best Patterns 
 
Another pattern observed in share contracts in Southeast Asia is that 
the extent to which the landowner shares the costs of variable inputs 
is directly related to the landowner’s output share.  In premarital law 
Philippines, there were two main types of tenancy contracts.  In 
regions where land quality was good and landowners usually lived in 
the same municipalities as the tenants, landowners’ shares tended to 
be 50 percent, but they also had a share of 50 percent of the fertilizer 
costs and some of the other input expenses.  In poorer quality 
regions, especially where landowners were absentee, landowner 
shares were typically in the neighborhood of one-third and tenants 
bore all of the expenses.  Similar patterns can be found in Indonesia 
and Bangladesh except that landowner shares are higher.  In those 
countries where the landowner’s share is 50 percent, the tenant 
usually bears all of the costs.  Where the landowner’s share is two-
thirds, the landowner also shares the cost of fertilizer and some other 
inputs (Roumasset and James 1978, Rudra 1975, Takahashi 1969). 
 
If the tenant’s cost share is set equal to his output share, then his 
first-order conditions for a profit maximum imply that he will choose 
the efficient levels of nonlabor variable inputs (Schickele 1941, 
Heady 1947).  But in a first-best world, the efficient levels of inputs 
can also be guaranteed simp ly by contractually stipulating those 
input levels.  That is, a contract with fifty-fifty sharing of both output 
and inputs is equivalent in a first-best sense to a contract wherein 
efficient input levels are contractually stipulated, the tenant pays for 
all of the inputs, but the tenants output share is sufficiently above 50 
percent so that he receives exactly the same income as in the fifty-
fifty contract.  Therefore, even though cost sharing provides an 
additional mechanism by which rewards to factors of production can 
be adjusted to their competitive levels, the mechanism is superfluous.  
In order to explain the institution of cost sharing, then, we must 
introduce second-best considerations. 
 
The key to explaining the incidence of cost sharing lies in relaxing 
the “first-best” assumptions of perfect information and zero costs of 
enforcement.  If enforcement is costly and production responses are 
not known by both landowner and tenant, it will not necessarily be 
optimal to prescribe the inputs in advance and enforce the contractual 
provisions dealing with contributions of these inputs.  Suppose, for  
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example, that the tenant has a comparative advantage in making the 
fertilization decision.  By requiring the tenant to pay for the same 
fraction of fertilization as his output share, the landowner can give the 
tenant the incentive to use the efficient level of fertilizer.17 
 
There is still an enforcement problem left with cost sharing, 
however, since the unsupervised tenant has some incentive to report 
using more fertilizer than he actually did.  This incentive will be 
especially great for tenants with high output shares.  In addition, since 
tenants with higher shares tend to have lower quality land, the marginal 
product of modern inputs will generally be lower as well.  Thus, the 
loss that a landowner of poor quality land bears by not giving his 
tenant the cost sharing incentive to use efficient levels of fertilizer and 
pesticides is likely to be less than the supervision costs to him of 
insuring these inputs are actually applied. 
 
The introduction of information and enforcement costs helps explain 
why we generally observe a rather limited number of agricultural 
contracts rather than the infinite number of possible combinations of 
output shares, contributions of factors, and cost sharing.  There are two 
such predominant patterns found in share tenancy for rice.  The first 
type occurs on relatively good land and is characterized by higher 
landowner shares, higher incidence of cost sharing, and greater 
involvement by the landowner in management and supervision.  The 
owner’s share of output is usually fifty-fifty for this type of contract in 
the Philippines.  The second type occurs more frequently on farms with 
lower potential productivity and is characterized by lower landowner 
shares, no cost sharing, and minimal landowner involvement in 
decision-making and supervision.  Typically, the landowners are 
“absentee.”  The Philippine landowner’s share in this type of 
arrangement is usually in the neighborhood of one-third.18 
 
The second best explanation for the incidence of cost sharing also 
serves to explain the increase in cost sharing following the introduction 
of HYVs in the Philippines, Bangladesh, and India.19   
 
17.  Mangahas et al. (1976) show that this is roughly the case for share tenants on a 
fifty-fifty sharing system in NuevaEcija. 
18.  This difference was confirmed in the Camarines Sur survey of rice farms 
conducted by the senior author in 1977. 
19.  Roumasset (1976), Bangladesh Rice Research Institute Survey, and Kessinger 
(1974) 
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The excess burden associated with not sharing expenses for fertilizer and 
other variable inputs will be low (especially since tenants without cost sharing 
provisions get a higher share of the output).  Now since the introduction of 
HYVs raises the marginal product of fertilizer, the excess burden of not 
providing cost sharing increases. Thus, the introduction of HYVs causes cost 
sharing to be an economically viable institution in some of the situations here 
it was previously dominated by an alternative contract. 
 
The first- and second- best efficiency principles can also be used to explain 
patterns in harvesters’ shares.  The harvesters are the third parties in 
contractual agreements for rice production.  In share contracts, the landowners 
and tenants typically divide the crop after deducting a percentage share for 
harvesters.  Like output shares, differences in harvesters’ shares reflect 
differences in land quality, factor prices, and relative contributions. 
 
Hayami (1978b) has documented the tendency for the percentage of output 
given to harvesters to adjust so that the implicit wage is close to the 
equilibrium wage for similar work.  This tendency of harvesters’ shares to 
adjust to equilibrium wages is a special case of the first-best efficiency 
principle. 
 
In densely populated rice areas of Central Java and Bali, Indonesia, 
harvesters receive only one-tenth of the crop (Geertz 1963).  In the 
Philippines, harvesters’ shares range from one-fifth to one-eighth in most 
lowland areas.20 The lower harvesters’ shares in Indonesia are due to the lower 
real wages compared to the Philippines. 
 
Within the Philippines, harvesters’ shares also vary according to 
physiological densities and real wages.  Prior to 1960, harvesters received as 
little as one-twentieth of the crop in densely settled Ilocos Norte, while in 
recently pioneered Isabella they got up to one-half of the crop (Lewis 1971).21  
Currently harvesters’ shares in the Philippines range from one-fifth of the crop 
in low density areas of Mindanao, Palawan, and Northern Luzon to between 
one-sixth and one-eighth of the crop in densely settled central and Southern 
Luzon and the Visayas.22 
 
20.  Information received from V. Cordova, Agricultural economics Department, International 
Rice Research Institute. 
21.  The one-half share was partly due to the higher wages in Isabella and partly due to the low 
yields received in the early years when the rice fields were just being est ablished. 
22.  Information for the densely populated provinces is from the senior author’s survey of rice 
farms in Bicol in 1977 and recent field studies in Luzon by the International Rice Research 
Institute.  For Mindanao and other less densely populated areas, the information derives from 
preliminary findings reported to the junior author by the Development Academy of the 
Philippines doing work in these areas.  
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In upland areas and in relatively poor quality rain fed areas, harvesters’ 
percentage shares in the Philippines are higher than in the better 
quality lowland areas.  For example, in some of the low productivity 
areas of Daraga, Albay, harvesters get three thirteenths of the gross and 
seven twenty-sixths if they do the weeding.23 
 
While the first-best principle explains differences in harvesters’ 
shares across location and through time, it does not explain the 
existence of harvesters’ shares in the first place, i.e., why harvesters 
are paid a share of the crop instead of a wage.  For this we need to 
invoke the well-known principle that sharing provides some incentive 
to do the job well (Stiglitz 1974).  If harvesters were paid a wage it 
would be necessary to expand substantial effort in supervision to guard 
against “shirking” (Alchain and Demsetz 1972).  If, on the other hand, 
workers were paid on a piece rate basis, i.e., by the amount of rice 
harvested, then they would try to maximize the amount harvested per 
hour and this would inevitably lead to an incomplete harvesting job.  
Again, this could be offset by supervision, but only at some cost.  
 
Another observation that cannot be explained by first-best theory is 
the finding that harvesters’ shares adjust to changes in factor prices and 
technology in quite different ways, even in nearby villages.  For 
example, in one village in Laguna, Philippines, harvesters’ shares were 
simply lowered from one-sixth to one-eighth in response to excess 
supply of harvesters (Kikuchi et al. 1978).  In another village close-by, 
farm operators responded to the same excess supply condition by 
requiring harvesters to do the weeding without additional 
compensation (Kikuchi et al. 1977).  Hayami has constructed a 
political economy explanation for this observation.  In the village 
where harvesters’ shares were lowered to one-eighth, there are only 
two large farmers.  While these farmers did suffer some threats and 
intentional damages, they were strong enough to make the change from 
one-sixth to one-eighth stick.  In contrast, in the village where 
harvester’s share remained at one-sixth, there were several small 
landowners.  No one landowner had the power to become a leader and 
successfully innovate a change to one-eighth.  Also, the transaction 
costs of all the landowners getting together to enforce a change to one-
eighth would have been high (Hayami 1978a, 1978b). 
 
 
23.  Camarines Sur/Albay survey, 1977.  More precisely, harvesters get three kerosene 
cans of rice for every ten cans to the farm operator.  But if the harvesters have also done 
weeding, then their three cans are “ubong” or rounded. 
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While this political economy argument has some appeal, it appears not to 
apply in similar situations.  In the Bicol provinces of Albay and Camarines 
Sur, for example, the most common change in the harvesting system has been 
that harvesters’ have been required to do the weeding.  This institutional 
arrangement, called “ilani,” has been adopted rather quickly, even in villages 
where ownership of land is widely dispersed.24 
 
The gama or ilani system is now beginning to spread to other operations 
especially land preparation and transplanting.  This trend coincides with the 
trend toward increased hired labor.  In high productivity regions in the 
Philippines where the new technology has been particularly successful, labor 
inputs per hectare are increasing faster than average farm size is decreasing.  
At the same time, farm families are actually putting in less labor per hectare.  
These factors together imply a substantial increase in hired labor; tying the 
hired labor to harvesting and paying the percentage share is an efficient way 
to contract for labor, for the reasons discussed above.25 
 
As a final puzzle, consider the question “Why, as documented by Day 
(1967) did the incidence of sharecropping in America diminish rapidly as 
harvesting operations became more and more mechanized?”  As 
mechanization increased the size of the minimum efficient farm unit, the 
tenant was unable to provide all of the preharvest labor and generally did not 
have the skills required for supervision of additional hired labor.  
Furthermore, since it is efficient for the owner of farm equipment to either 
operate it or be in a position to closely supervise this operation (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976), mist tenants would have been at a comparative disadvantage 
since the could not afford to buy expensive farm equipment and were not able 
to get the loans to do so. 
 
IV.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
In sections I and II, a methodology has been outlined which may be suitable 
for explaining patterns in institutional arrangements found in agricultural 
production.  This methodology is illustrated in section III.  The first-best 
efficiency principle explains the following patterns.  Farm size and tenant 
share are inversely related with land quality.   
 
24.  This was gathered from a survey of rice farming practices in Albay and Camarines Sur 
conducted in cooperation with the Institute of Philippine Culture, 1977. 
25.  These observations were made by R. Barker based on studies conducted by the Economics 
Department at the International Rice Research Institute and by L. Darra based on studies 
conducted by the Special Studies Division of the Department of Agriculture, Philippines. 
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Landowner shares vary directly with the rent-wage ratio if the 
elasticity of substitution is less than one.  But where the elasticity of 
substitution is near one and technological change has been land saving, 
landowner shares tend to fall even as the rent-wage ratio increases.  
Landowner shares also vary directly with the percentage of capital and 
management provided by the landowner and with the production 
elasticity of capital.  First-best efficiency also explains the direct 
relationship between landowner shares and variable inputs and 
landowner share in output but does not explain why cost sharing 
should exist at all.  For that we invoked the second-best efficiency 
principle.  Specifically, since the benefit of cost sharing increases with 
the marginal products of various inputs, cost sharing will be more 
frequent on better quality land and more frequent after technological 
innovations that increase the marginal productivity of inputs.  The 
tendency to pay harvesters with the share of produce and the trend 
toward linking harvesting with other labor operations were also 
explained with the second-best principle. 
Just as using the postulate of rationality to explain individual 
behavior does not prove that individuals are rational, using the 
principles of efficiency to explain institutions does not prove that those 
institutions are efficient.  Indeed, we have not tried to determine to 
what extent agricultural institutions are efficient.  However, the 
framework used to explain such patterns in agricultural contracts could 
also be used for such a test.  To the extent that one can find patterns in 
agricultural institutions which cannot be explained with the efficiency 
principle and which can be explained by other considerations (e.g. 
monopoly power), then one has established a prima facie case for 
inefficiency.26 However, the success of the efficiency principles in 
explaining certain observed patterns does invalidate any a priori 
conclusions about the inefficiency of particular contracts such as share 
tenancy and similarly invalidates the theory that institutions necessarily 
act as constraints to development. 
 
 
 
 
 
26.  This still does not imply that government is warranted, however.  For that, one 
must weight the benefits associated with the government reducing inefficiency against 
the cost of the government action itself. 
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